【6.10| 讲座通知】管理学系学术讲座

　　题目：Pressured to Perform: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Initial CEO Contract Length

主讲： Guoli Chen（陈国立）

时间：2019年6月10日（周一）下午 1:30-3:00

地点：科研楼101

讲座内容：This paper examines whether Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with shorter initial contract length suffer from greater time pressure to prove their value, and consequently engage in more visible efforts to obtain the benefit of contract renewal. Using a unique dataset of 1,227 CEO contracts and exploiting an exogenous shock to shorten the CEO contract length, we document the following results: (1) CEOs with shorter initial contract lengths engage in efforts which are more visible (such as M&A, but less on R&D which is less visible). However, visible efforts such as M&As deliver relatively weaker performance. (2) The likelihood of contract renewal is higher among CEOs who engage in more visible efforts, despite the relatively weaker performance. (3) Firms with good corporate governance mitigate the short-term visible effort bias.

报告人简介: 陈国立现是全球顶尖商学院INSEAD（欧洲工商管理学院）战略管理学副教授。他从宾州州立大学获得博士学位, 主要研究范围包括高层管理团队和董事会对公司战略和组织绩效的影响，以及公司治理。研究成果曾经发表在　Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Organization Science, and Leadership Quarterly等一流刊物上。多次获得美国管理学会年会　（Academy of Management Conference）和 战略管理学会（Strategic Management Society) 会议上奖励。他现在是Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review的编委会成员。由于他的杰出学术贡献，陈教授获得了战略管理学会（Strategic Management Society)的学术新星奖　(2016)　和荣获新加坡４０岁以下最有影响力的商学教授。

　　*来源 | 对外经贸商学院

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