报告题目：Advisors Lending to the Advised Acquirer as a Last Resort

　　报 告 人：Xueping Wu（香港城市大学 副教授）

　　时 间：2017年11月24日（周五）下午16:00-17:30

　　地 点：岭南堂黄炳礼会议室

　　语 言：中文+英文

　　Abstract:

　　It has become apparent in recent decades that acquirers’ financial advisors also participate in financing the M&A they advise on. These advisor-led syndicated loans have unusually high spreads. The advisor’s dual role (advisory and financing) also seems to reduce the acquirer’s M&A announcement effect. All of this could reflect a conflict of interest where financial advisors would abet corporate overinvestment to share in rents arising from managerial empire building, undermining the information production and certification roles of banks in loan financing. However, our analysis reveals that post-M&A underperformance is absent for these acquirers, and their need for external finance to complete ambitious acquisitions justifies premium pricing in advisor dual-role lending. The investment banks act as last-resort lenders in these big-ticket deals.

　　报告人介绍：

　　Dr. Xueping Wu is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics and Finance of the City University of Hong Kong. His research interests are both theoretical and empirical, covering Corporate Finance, Asset Pricing and Capital Markets, and International Finance. He has published papers in high quality academic journals including the Journal of Business and JFQA. He has won several best paper awards including the 1999-WFA Award for the Best Paper in Corporate Finance. His recent research agenda is to try to establish a theory of growth type compatibility in corporate finance – a theory that explains why firms grow and seek financing in a persistent way under asymmetric informational environments. He is also working on how financial intermediaries such as financial advisors help mitigate market imperfection.

　　更多精彩内容，请关注MBA智库商学院微信公众平台： mbalib-mba 。